Introduction
need also to consider the capacity in which individuals should be involved (Mullen 2008, p. 399) . Democratic legitimacy in this sense is arguably dependent on every person within the constituency (or at least every member satisfying certain criteria, for example adulthood) having the opportunity to express an opinion (see Harris 1998, p.87) .
A further problem then concerns processes or mechanisms of participation.
One solution could lie in the adoption of an aggregative approach (see Chambers Coordinated by the Centre for Philosophy of Law -Université catholique de Louvain -http://refgov.cpdr.ucl.ac.be WP-SGI-18 5 2003, p. 308), for example using large scale surveys giving each member of the constituency the opportunity to have a direct say on particular issues. Unsurprisingly the appeal of this method is likely to be limited to relatively simple issues where straightforward choices may be made between limited numbers of fixed options, and even then this model would require an explanation of how responses should be aggregated in order to reach a decision. In more complex cases there may be concerns about the limited opportunity for participants to give voice to nuanced ideas, choices, or arguments (cf. Mullen 2008, pp. 401-402) . Moreover, unless participants have a say in deciding what choices should be offered, or who should set these choices, then we might question the extent to which the results of surveys could be considered to have resulted from the opinions of the constituency.
Elections might appear to avoid the limitations of surveys, while retaining democratic legitimacy by providing each member of the relevant constituency with the opportunity to express an opinion. Members of the constituency could each have a vote for (and could stand as) representatives to form a group which would engage in the definition and discussion of issues, problems and solutions. But while this approach would facilitate debate among representatives chosen by the constituency, problems of inclusiveness and depth of involvement remain. One concern is the tendency for varying levels of participation by different groups in formal electoral processes (Tritter and McCallum 2006, p. 160) . A further difficulty is raised by Dryzek, who argues that if the rationale for representation by an elected group stems from the democratic value placed on enabling depth of involvement in deciding issues, then we should be concerned if the process of choosing the system for electing the group is not marked by similar depth of involvement by members of the relevant constituency. However, if each person is to have a say in settling the system for election, then it is difficult to see how there can be depth to their involvement. In other words limited involvement in choosing the electoral system means that 'the problem of scale reappears, only this time in a slightly different location ' (Dryzek 2001, p. 653 Given the persistent tension between inclusiveness and depth of involvement (Tritter and McCallum 2006, p. 162) , we may consider whether democratic legitimacy can be reframed in a way that does not require opportunity for participation by every member of a constituency (cf. Dryzek 2001, p. 657) . Accordingly, this section suggests an alternative conception of democratic legitimacy based on public participation leading to decisions that can be justified to the public. Although we argue that ultimately it is impossible to claim full democratic legitimacy for decisions arrived at through public participation in whatever form, we nevertheless suggest that a deliberative approach may contribute to increased confidence in the legitimacy of decisions and decisionmaking processes.
Justification to all affected
While commenting that there are various conceptions of deliberative democracy, Chambers suggests a common theme in the ideal of legitimacy as involving 'justification to all affected' (Chambers 2003, p. 309; see also Bohman 1998, p. 402) .
Cohen maintains that 'outcomes are democratically legitimate if and only if they could be the object of a free and reasoned agreement among equals' (Cohen 2006, p162) . Following these ideas, democratic legitimacy might be claimed where participation leads to reasoned decisions that are justifiable to the public in the relevant constituency. This conception focuses attention on whether there are methods of public participation, and participatory fora or structures, that have the potential to facilitate decisions that have the quality of justifiability.
In order for legitimacy to be grounded in this way, participants must have, or be able to acquire, relevant knowledge or understanding, and have or be able to develop the capacity to articulate views on policy issues. In the case of healthcare policy and implementation, practical arrangements would need to be made to provide the participants with access to sufficient information and knowledge to facilitate their engagement in debate on quite technical matters (cf. Wakeford 2002), for example relating to a population's needs and preferences, finance, measurement of health gain, knowledge of transport systems, and accessibility. Deliberation would then involve participants using their understanding of these technical issues to question or test Coordinated by the Centre for Philosophy of Law -Université catholique de Louvain -http://refgov.cpdr.ucl.ac.be WP-SGI-18 7 existing and proposed policy. The deliberations might be expected to result in at least some decisions which could be explained and justified to the wider public (cf. Chisholm et. al. 2007, p. 16) . However, one problem here is that technical issues (for instance concerning the organisation and management of public services, or the implementation of regulation) frequently cannot be separated from social and ethical considerations of value, including matters of how values should be interpreted in decision-making (see Mullen 2008, pp. 397-398; see also Dryzek 2001, p. 658) ).
Consider, for example, the question of whether a general practice surgery should be relocated or merged with the potential for improved quality of specialist services, but at the cost of reduced accessibility for a small section of a community (see Weale 2006, p.38) . While technical issues are relevant (such as costs or the degree of accessibility associated each option), this question also raises matters of value such as the value that should be given to preserving life, or the priority that should be accorded the protection of minority interests weighed against the benefits to a majority. Where ethical and social considerations are at stake, then it may be thought difficult for participants to agree on decisions, and more problematic to justify those decisions to the public. This difficulty need not necessarily prevent participants from reaching agreement on decisions which are supported by reasoned arguments. In particular, we might expect that processes of deliberation would enable participants to address and resolve concerns or criticisms about each other's arguments and judgments. We may further suggest that if participants reach agreement on reasoned decisions then there is some basis for holding that the public may also accept those decisions. Heysse describes a case for claiming that we might expect such agreement among participants and acceptance by the wider constituency:
'If I believe myself to have good arguments for a particular judgment (for instance concerning the moral justification of a certain conception of justice) these arguments must be good enough for others. Consequently, I must believe that either those others will (ultimately) come to agree with my judgment or their judgment is flawed (i.e. misinformed, prejudiced, incompetent, etc.) . ' (2006, p. However there are at least two sources of a counter case that can be made against the expectation that a reasoned argument will be justifiable in this way. First, it is possible that the public might reject reasoned decisions resulting from participants' deliberations, and moreover that they might have reasons to support their rejection. If this occurred, then it could be claimed that the participants' decisions were not justified to the public. People may have reasons for disputing even it does not necessarily follow that if people do not engage in a debate they have no reasons to reject the outcome of that debate. This difficulty of knowing whether account has been given to relevant ethical assumptions is one reason for caution in claiming that decisions resulting from deliberation can ever be fully or completely legitimate.
Secondly, as Dryzek has noted, deliberation may not end in consensus (2001, p. 661) . A particular difficulty is that judgments which are the result of a process of reasoned argument that has considered relevant alternative ethical positions might still be countered by other reasoned arguments. To see this, consider again the debate on whether a surgery should be relocated or merged. Let us assume participants in the discussion begin from differing positions, but can nevertheless be understood as engaging in a communicative action in which they attempt to resolve one another's criticisms and to reach agreement (cf. Habermas 1998, p. 232). Further let us assume they have a shared conception of what constitutes a reasoned argument (for instance, on how to verify technical details, or on whether a particular step in the argument is rational one), and agree on matters of what constitutes relevant considerations (for instance, accepting that accessibility is important). Despite all of this, discussion can still end in basic disagreement on the relative priorities that should be given to ethical considerations (cf. Dworkin 1996, p. 113; Mullen 2008, p. 405) . Dryzek argues that despite such disagreement it might nevertheless be possible to reach 'workable agreements' which are broadly compatible with each of the conflicting arguments (2001, p. 661) . While this may be possible in some circumstances, in other cases conflicting arguments seem to require different and incompatible actions -for example disagreement on whether accessibility to services for each person in a population should take priority over increased quality which brings improved health to some. This possibility of conflicting positions each supported by reasoned arguments reinforces the suggestion of the need for caution in claiming legitimacy in this deliberative sense. The decisions might be justifiable to the relevant constituency, assuming that all accept they are grounded in reasoned argument. However, the European FP6 -Integrated Project Coordinated by the Centre for Philosophy of Law -Université catholique de Louvain -http://refgov.cpdr.ucl.ac.be WP-SGI-18 10 possibility remains that there would be other, conflicting decisions which are also based on arguments which all agree to be sound, and which might also be justifiable.
Where two conflicting positions could both be supported by reasoned arguments, then it is plausible to allow that people may prefer either position and thus deny that the other position is justified.
Increased confidence in democratic legitimacy
Despite the obstacles to claiming full legitimacy on the basis of justification to the public, deliberative participation may still contribute to increased confidence in the democratic legitimacy of decisions. Such confidence is likely to require the maximising of opportunities for testing whether ideas of decision-makers can or cannot be justified to the public, and to depend at least in part on how effectively participants can develop ideas and challenges which take account of the range of positions held by members of the relevant constituency (cf. Dryzek 2001).
Any disagreement between participants and decision-makers could prompt discussion in which decision-makers would give reasons for rejecting the participants' judgments: for instance arguing that ideas failed to properly take account of technical aspects, or that they were inconsistent, or possibly that there was a valid alternative position. This may lead to further questions from participants (possibly after further deliberation), to which further responses should in turn be provided. If, ultimately, decision-makers could not provide a reasoned response to such challenges, then there would be a case for them adopting participants' judgments. If decision-makers failed to accept the participants' judgments but could not provide a reasoned counterargument, then we would have grounds to doubt that the decision-makers' ideas could even potentially have democratic legitimacy as the 'object of a free and reasoned agreement among equals' (Cohen 2006, p.162) . So while we may not be able to claim that the reasoned decisions of participants would be justifiable to the whole of the relevant constituency, we can maintain that a decision would not be justifiable to the constituency if participants have rejected it on the ground that it is not supported by reasoned arguments.
The extent of public confidence in democratic legitimacy will depend ultimately on how the results of debate and decisions reached by participants are 
Evaluating participatory arrangements
The foregoing discussion has provided an account of how public participation in decision-making might be used in differing ways to strengthen democratic society.
That is, surveys concerning straightforward choices might provide an element of democratic legitimacy by giving each member of the relevant constituency a say on specific issues of policy and implementation. Elections might supply each member with a limited voice, and allow for more detailed discussion through the role played by elected representatives. Finally, a conception of deliberative participation may enable increased confidence in the legitimacy of decisions by testing whether reasoned arguments can be given against challenges to those decisions. 12 evaluation of the potential contribution of public participation to democratic decisionmaking. We begin by outlining how the successive structures for participation might contribute to legitimate decision-making, before describing the changes to the duty on the part of NHS bodies to consult the public. Finally we evaluate the democratic potential of the current system of PPI relative to previous arrangements, using the theoretical analysis developed above.
Local involvement networks and their predecessors
LINks are required to involve patients and the public in decisions concerning the provision of health and social care across an entire local authority area. This broad remit differs significantly from the more limited role of Forums, which had sought to represent patient and public interests in services provided by a single NHS Trust (HCHC 2007, pp. 18) . By contrast CHCs had not been attached to individual NHS Trusts but instead represented the public's interests in 'local health services' (HCHC 2007, pp. 18 ). LINks will obtain views from citizens and service users about health and social care needs and experiences, and convey those views to organisations responsible for commissioning, providing, and managing local health and social care services. In addition, LINks will make 'reports and recommendations about how local care services could or ought to be improved' (2007 Act, s221(c)), and … 'consider how to address areas of concern' (such as health inequalities -see DoH 2007b, p. 34). This suggests that LINks will play a proactive role in shaping agendas, beyond gathering and conveying of information about needs and preferences. In making reports and recommendations, LINks will have to consider how different needs should be met in the light of competing policies and underlying values (such as respect for autonomy, or reduction of inequalities). While Forums and CHCs also had the option of making considered recommendations, the significant difference here is in the range of public service issues covered by the organisations. The wide terms of reference enjoyed by LINks compared with their predecessors will enable them to make reports and recommendations concerning multiple services. This will avoid difficulties that had confronted Forums in addressing problems within one service which were related to deficiencies in other services outside their remit (see HCHC 2007, p. 21). (HCHC 2007, paras 115-126) . In the steering group model, the detailed discussion of issues will primarily fall to a limited number of people. This need not preclude roles for other participants in raising issues and contributing to discussion, and indeed Department of Health guidance states that '[t]he governing group should not itself act as a consultative body or speak on behalf of the LINk without the wider participants' involvement and consent ' (DoH 2007a, p.19) . While the adoption of a network model presents the opportunity for more people to directly engage in discussions, it would also make internal decision-making more complicated, and may lead to concerns about inclusivity (for instance, if de facto decision-making tends to rest with a few participants). The role of participants in internal decision-making may also be influenced by the relationship between the LINk, the local authority and the The Court of Appeal held that while the duty did indeed apply in these circumstances, it could be discharged by mere provision of information (see Fudge, R (on the If the democratic potential of PPI is assessed according to how far arrangements for participation may increase confidence in the legitimacy of decisions, the recent reforms offer more mixed prospects. Prior to the 2007 Act, the Section 11 consultation duty provided scope for enhancing debate and deliberation on a range of issues concerning local policy, planning and implementation. The possibility that relevant ideas and challenges by members of the public might inform and influence decision-making was acknowledged in official guidance, which specifically encouraged discussion with patients and public before choices had been framed (DoH 2003, p.7) . While there is evidence that this guidance was followed in at least some cases (see HCHC 2007, paras 243-50) , there were also moves to restrict the range of issues subject to the duty, which would have limited any deliberative value in these arrangements. As we have seen, the revised duty under the 2007 Act reduces further the potential for deliberation. The effect of the reform is arguably to limit the role of patients and public to that of consumers (cf. Tritter and McCallum 2006, p. 161) , rather than citizens contributing to a broader debate on wider issues such as the degree of private sector involvement in healthcare provision. Nevertheless, there is also a sense in which the reformed consultation duty may enhance prospects for deliberation, albeit on narrower range of issues. As we have noted, if deliberative participation is to increase confidence in democratic legitimacy then decision-makers A further question is whether the LINk chooses a governance structure limiting debate within smaller governing groups or allowing a broad range of participants. The risk with the former approach is that the members of the governing group may not between them possess the range of relevant ideas and challenges that could be brought into play by a larger grouping of participants. The latter model appears to offer greater opportunity for including people with a range of ideas, but carries the risk that debating fora may become over-complicated, or dominated by a minority of participants. As with the duty to report on commissioning consultations, the duty to consider and respond to LINks' reports and recommendations may help to Similarly, the obligation on OSCs to 'take into account any relevant information provided by a local involvement network ' (2007 Act, s226) , where it decides to take up a matter referred by a LINk, may create incentives for debate and deliberation on issues of concern to service users and citizens. Ultimately, although the formal framework for LINks offers significant potential for improving the quality of deliberation, the realisation of this potential depends in practice on the ways in LINks conduct their work, and on how decision-makers respond to their arguments.
Conclusion
In subjecting to critical scrutiny the assumed democratic role of public participation in modern societies, we have argued in this article that citizen engagement in whatever form can only ever make a limited contribution to democratic decision making. On the one hand, public participation which claims legitimacy by including every member of a relevant constituency has an appeal which is reduced by limitations in the depth of participation which is possible. On the other hand, we need also to be cautious about claiming legitimacy for participation based on conceptions of deliberative democracy, since we can never be satisfied that decisions are capable of being fully or completely justified to the public in the relevant constituency.
Nevertheless, to the extent that it may help rule out decisions that would not be justifiable to the public, we have suggested that the deliberative approach holds the possibility of increasing democratic confidence in decisions. In this sense we can conclude that deliberation may contribute to democratic decision-making.
We have suggested that the clarification of alternative democratic rationales for public participation is a necessary preliminary to empirical research investigating the effectiveness of policies such as PPI. In other words, the ultimate evaluation of the democratic potential of practical arrangements for public participation cannot properly be accomplished other than on the basis of in-depth consideration of the underlying purpose or purposes of policies supporting the involvement of citizens and service users in decision making. The analysis of the reformed PPI framework in England has shown how arrangements for public participation with only weak provision for potential. In particular we have suggested that the current PPI system holds some promise for deliberation which could increase confidence in the legitimacy of decisions. However, the realisation of this potential is contingent on several aspects of the practice of participation. The success of the new regime will depend on the effective engagement of a broad range of participants in deliberative processes, and on the contribution of ideas and challenges by members of the public. How far the deliberative approach can enhance confidence in the democratic legitimacy of decisions will depend also on the willingness of key actors in healthcare networks to respond appropriately to those ideas and challenges in their decisions on policy and implementation. We argue elsewhere (Vincent-Jones and Mullen 2010) that the cognitive processes involved in effective justification to the public serve not only to increase confidence in legitimacy, but also as an essential condition for an alternative approach to the evaluation of public participation, which conceives of the advancement of the public interest in democratic societies in terms of the notion of reflexive governance as social learning.
